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extracted by capital. The injustices embedded in this system need to be made “liveable” through
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INTRODUCTION
A new order is being constructed through the continuous extraction of data from our social lives.
This new order, optimised for the creation of economic value, may well become the social order
on which the next phase of capitalism depends for its viability. As part of that emerging order,
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calls for the regulation of data processing have intensified in the past two years, unsurprisingly
perhaps given that capitalism has shown that it needs to be regulated if it is to be made liveable
(Polanyi, 2001). But this push for regulation has been framed entirely in terms of taming certain
rogue forms of contemporary capitalism. This article argues, however, that to frame data issues
solely in terms of a “bad” form of capitalism misses the full scope, scale and nature of what is
happening with data. Legal, social and civic responses to what is underway need to be grounded
in a broader argument about what we will call “data colonialism”.
There is no doubt of course that what is happening with data today is inextricably linked to the
development of capitalism. But is something even larger going on? We argue here that today’s
quantification of the social—also known as datafication (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013;
Van Dijck, 2014)—represents the first step in a new form of colonialism. This emerging order
has long-term consequences that may be as far-reaching as were the appropriations carried out
by historic colonialism for the benefit of the capitalist economies and international legal order
that subsequently developed.
Recognising what is happening with data as a colonial move means acknowledging the full scope
of the resource appropriation under way today through datafication: it is human life itself that is
being appropriated so that it can be annexed directly to capital as part of a reconstruction of the
very spaces of social experience. In arguing this, we share some common ground with Shoshana
Zuboff’s  well-known  argument  on  “surveillance  capitalism”,  but  there  are  also  crucial
differences, which we briefly summarise in three points here (and further unpack later). 1
First, the transformation of what can be considered an input to capital actually goes well beyond
what has been observed in the social media sector to include, for example, the rise of logistics,
the new methods of control in the workplace, the emergence of platforms as new structures for
profit  extraction  (for  instance,  in  transportation  and  tourism),  and  most  generally  the
reformulation of capitalism’s default business model around the extraction and management of
data (Davenport, 2014). 2 What is going on with data, in other words, is much wider than a
problem with  a  limited  number  of  rogue  surveillance  capitalists  who  have  gone  astray,  a
problem that can be corrected by their reform. There is only one historic precedent for such a
shift  in  the  resources  available  for  economic  exploitation,  and  that  is  the  emergence  of
colonialism in the late 15th and early 16th centuries. 3
Second,  rethinking data processes on this longer 500-year time-scale allows us to see their
implications for capitalism’s future in a broader way, too. Here we must recall that industrial
capitalism itself was only made possible by the profits and socioeconomic reconfigurations that
came with historic colonialism.
Third, a colonial framing highlights two central aspects of today’s transformations that would
otherwise seem like mere collateral: the subjugation of human beings that is necessary to a
resource appropriation on this scale (relations of subjection to external powers were central to
historic colonialism), and the grounding of this entire transformation in a general rationality
which imposes upon the world a very singular vision of Big Data’s superior claim on knowledge
(just as colonisers justified their appropriation on the ground of the West’s superior rationality).
Our  argument  will  consider  the  long-term  historical  relations  between  capitalism  and
colonialism in the first part of this article, and in the second part offer a discussion—informed by
decolonial theory—of Carl Schmitt’s classic interpretation of historic colonialism’s relation to
international law. We hope to give more substance to general calls to recognise the fight against
“dataism” (Van Dijck, 2014) as “the most urgent political and economic project” of the 21st
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century (Harari,  2016,  p.  459).  This  article,  written from the intersection of  social  theory,
decolonial theory, and critical data studies rather than policy studies, will hopefully be useful to
those who wish to develop a more robust starting-point for critical work on data policy.
A DECOLONIAL READING OF DATAFICATION
In this first section, we summarise our arguments for analysing contemporary practices of data
extraction and data processing as replicating colonial modes of exploitation (see Couldry and
Mejias, 2018; Couldry and Mejias, 2019). This will allow us to provide the starting-point for our
policy-related discussion later on.
The public is often told that "data is the new oil" (Economist, 2017). A recent article in the
Harvard Business Review goes further and argues not only that “data is the fuel of the new
economy, and even more so of the economy to come,” but also that:
Algorithms trained by all these digital traces will be globally transformational. It’s
possible that new world order will emerge from it, along with a new “GDP” – gross
data product – that captures an emerging measure of wealth and power of nations
(Chakravorti, Bhalli and Chaturvedi, 2019).
While the evocative idea of “new oil” might recall the benefits (for some) of historic colonialism,
it obscures precisely the most important level at which data colonialism must be empirically
studied. The most fundamental fact about data is that it  is not like oil,  but rather a social
construct operating at a specific moment in history (Gitelman, 2014; Scholz, 2018), driven by
much wider economic and social forces. The concept of data colonialism, therefore, highlights
the reconfiguration of human life around the maximisation of data collection for profit. Without
the resulting data flow, there would be no substance related to human life that could, even
potentially, be called “oil”. The claim that data is like oil is thus an attempt to naturalise the
outcome of data’s collection, and so make data extraction (and the categories it embeds in daily
life) part of a social landscape whose contestability is hidden from view (Bowker and Star, 1999).
Since regulating data depends, fundamentally, on opening up that contestability, it is essential
to understand how the naturalisation of data collection occurs.
To do this, we draw on critical political economy and decolonial theory to trace continuities from
colonialism’s historic appropriation of territories and natural resources to the datafication of
everyday life today. While the modes, intensities, scales and contexts of dispossession have
changed, the underlying drive of today’s data processes remains the same: to acquire “territory”
and resources from which economic value can be extracted. To do so in no way diverts us from
an analysis of capitalism. On the contrary, it places datafication squarely within the centuries-
long relations between colonialism and capitalism, whose separation is now widely contested
(Williams, 1994; Beckert and Rockman, 2016). Far from being disconnected from capitalism,
the current phase of colonialism (data colonialism) is understood as preparing the way for a
new, still undefined stage of capitalism, just as historic colonialism paved the way gradually for
industrial capitalism. The medium for this long-term transformation are the interdependencies
and rationalities through which social relations, conducted and organised via processes of data
extraction, become a normal part of everyday life.
We therefore use the term “colonialism” not as a metaphor, 4 but to name an actual reality. In
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this  non-metaphorical  usage,  however,  our  focus  is  on  colonialism’s  longer-term historical
function: the dispossession of resources and the normalisation of that dispossession so as to
generate  a  new fuel  for  capitalism’s  global  growth.  Distinctive  to  data  colonialism are  the
subjection of human beings to new types of relations configured around the extraction of data,
and,  even more broadly,  the  imposition on human life  of  a  new vision of  knowledge and
rationality tailored to data extraction (the vision of Big Data).  Each generates fundamental
questions, in turn, about legal values such as freedom and autonomy, and challenges for existing
systems of commercial regulation (we return to those challenges in the next section).
Underlying our argument are two forms of analysis: an analysis of the political economy of the
data industry, or what we call the social quantification sector; and an analysis of the multimodal
forms of  exploitation  that  unfold  through our  participation  in  digital  platforms and data-
processing  infrastructures,  or  what  we  call  data relations.  These  two terms deserve  more
explanation.
The social quantification sector can be broken down into various sub-groups, starting with the
manufacturers of digital devices and personal assistants: well-known media brands such as
Amazon, Apple, Microsoft and Samsung, and less well-known makers of devices operating in the
fast-expanding ‘Internet of Things’. Another group in the social quantification sector includes
the builders of the computer-based environments and tools by means of which we connect:
household names such as Alibaba, Baidu, Facebook, Google, TenCent and WeChat. Yet another
group comprises the growing field of data brokers and data processing organisations such as
Acxiom, Equifax, and (in China) TalkingData that collect, aggregate, process, repackage, sell and
make decisions based on data of all sorts, while also supporting other organisations in their uses
of  data.  In  addition,  the  social  quantification  sector  also  includes  the  vast  domain  of
organisations that increasingly depend for their basic functions on processing data from social
life, whether to customise their services (like Netflix and Spotify), to link sellers and buyers (like
Airbnb, Uber, and Didi), or to exploit data in areas of government or security, such as Palantir
and Axon (formerly Taser). Finally, analytical consideration of the social impact of the social
quantification sector needs to take into account the vast areas of economic life where internal
data collection has become normalised as corporations’ basic mode of operation, for example in
logistics  (Cowan,  2014).  Corporations  such  as  IBM  are  key  supporters  of  this  wider
infrastructure  of  business  data  collection  (Davenport,  2014),  even  though  they  are  not
associated with either social media platforms or specialised data brokerage.
By  data  relations  we  do  not  mean  relations  between  data,  but  the  new  types  of
human/institutional  relations  through  which  data  becomes  extractable  and  available  for
conversion into economic value. When fully established in daily life, data relations will become
as naturalised as labour relations, and together comprise a second pillar of the social order on
which capitalism is based. 5 This transformation—we propose—goes much further even than the
shaping of social relations around the extraction of “surveillance capital” that Zuboff describes.
Under data colonialism, human life becomes, as it were, present to capital without obstruction,
although this “presence” is based on many levels of technosocial mediation. Data relations give
corporations a privileged “window” onto the world of social relations, and a privileged “handle”
on the levers of social differentiation. More generally, human life itself, including its relations to
technology,  becomes  a  direct  input  to  capital  and  potentially  exploitable  for  profit.  Data
relations make the social world readable to and manageable by corporations in ways that allow
not just the optimisation of profit, but also new models of social governance, what legal scholars
Niva Elkin-Koren and Eldar Haber (2016) call “governance by proxy”.
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In  this  context,  digital  spaces  for  social  life  and  economic  transactions  called  “platforms”
(Gillespie, 2010; compare Bucher, 2016; Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013) have significance beyond
their convenience for individuals and corporations. Platforms become software-constructed
spaces that produce the social  for capital.  Social  life  is  thereby transformed into an open
resource for extraction that is somehow “just there” for exploitation. For sure, capitalism has
always sought to commodify everything and control all inputs to its production process. But how
“everything”  is  defined  at  specific  historical  moments  varies.  What  is  unique  about  this
historical moment is that human life is becoming organised through data relations so that it
can be a direct input to capital. This transformation depends on many things: shifts in daily
habits  and  conventions,  software  architectures  that  shape  human  life  through,  as  Lessig
famously argued, “code” (Lessig, 2001), and explicit legal frameworks that legitimate, sanction
and  regulate  such  arrangements.  In  this  article,  we  focus  on  the  last,  but  including  the
underlying legal rationalities that, as Julie Cohen (2017) argues, work to frame data as owner-
less, redefining notions of privacy and property in order to establish a new moral order that
justifies the appropriation of data.
To  summarise  the  argument  so  far:  humanity  is  currently  undergoing  a  large-scale
transformation  of  a  social,  economic  and  legal  order,  based  on  the  massively  expanded
appropriation by capital of human life itself through the medium of data extraction. The long-
term sustainability of this transformation depends, however, on the regulation or harmonising
of various factors: the weight of habit and convenience in daily life; various social pressures on
consumers, producers and workers towards datafication, which amount to something like a life
force  (Grewal,  2008);  and,  crucially,  an  emerging  legal  infrastructure.  As  a  result,  larger
questions arise as to how to regulate this transformation and its emerging institutions. The
answers depend on what approach we take to the question of what sort of transformation this is.
We have argued, in condensed form, that this transformation can only be fully understood
bifocally, that is, through the double lens of capitalism and colonialism. In the second part of the
article,  we  extend  this  discussion  into  a  brief  review  of  current  approaches  to  regulating
personal data processing, and their limitations.
THINKING BEYOND EXISTING LEGAL APPROACHES TO
DATAFICATION
The building of a new social and economic order based on the extraction of value from human
life through data relations is not something that individuals can resist, or even manage, by
themselves.  It  matters  little  whether  I  delete  an app from my phone or  withdraw from a
platform. Nor, incidentally, can we expect much from the possibility that some players in data
markets  might  act  more  ethically  than others.  Society-wide  responses  are  needed to  such
society-wide transformations. If—to return once again to Polanyi (2001)—large-scale economic
change requires a double regulatory movement (first, the transformation of social relations so as
to fit the new economic organisation, and then the emergence of a social counter-movement to
make the transformation actually liveable), then the project of socially managing datafication is
likely to be long and complex, and legal reform must play some part in that.
We have little interest here in proposed legal reforms that make partial adjustments to how
social media platforms manage aspects of their operations (for example, the algorithms that
organise  personal  news  feeds).  Our  concern  instead  is  with  the  prospects  for  large-scale
regulation of the extraction of economic value from personal data, and what might currently be
Making data colonialism liveable: how might data’s social order be regulated?
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 6 June 2019 | Volume 8 | Issue 2
blocking this regulation (by “personal data” we mean not just data which explicitly relates to an
individual person, but any data whose collection and processing can generate decisions relating
to that person).
There is no doubt that important legal reforms concerning data practices have been advanced
recently. Five years ago, North American market rhetoric went largely uncontested, arguing that
the wholesale collection and processing of data, whether about a person (personal data, in a
narrow sense) or otherwise, was essential to the development of the global economy. It is easy to
find  examples  of  such  discourse,  for  example,  from the  World  Economic  Forum or  from
business consultants (Letouzé, 2012; World Economic Forum, 2011; McKinsey, 2011). But the
balance has been disturbed by one particular legislative intervention, the European General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into effect in May 2018.
The GDPR’s very first sentence announces a normative challenge to market rhetoric about data:
“the protection of natural persons in relation to the processing of personal data is a fundamental
right” (GDPR, recital 1). Thus, one of the GDPR’s basic ideas is that whether or not she is likely
to consent to it, the “data subject” must be informed “of the existence of a [data] processing
operation”  which  affects  her,  and  “its  purposes.”  Indeed,  she  should  be  informed  of  the
“consequences of any data profiling” (Recital 60). This challenged the until-then dominant idea
that personal data processing is just what corporations and markets do, and has been going on
for so long and on such a scale that it cannot be challenged (an argument Helen Nissenbaum
(2017) calls Big Data exceptionalism). Without going into the GDPR in detail, its importance as
a symbolic challenge to the ideology of ‘dataism’ (Van Dijck, 2014) cannot be denied. The GDPR
is being used as a model for legislative proposals in a number of countries across the world,
including Brazil and the UK, and compliance with the GDPR has become a major feature of
recent business practice.
While it is still unclear how effective the GDPR’s challenge to data practices from the perspective
of human rights such as privacy will be, there is no doubt of the influence its publication has had
on the climate of a global debate around data issues. Consider two UN reports from 2014 and
2018, both called “The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age” (UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, 2014, 2018). The 2014 report is almost entirely concerned with state surveillance; when
it mentions corporations (paragraphs 42-46), it focuses on whether they should accede to state
requests for access to their data. The question of whether corporations themselves should be
more responsive to human rights concerns regarding how they collect data—arguably the key
issues revealed, if not debated, in the 2013 Snowden revelations—is not even mentioned. By
2018 however, the emphasis had shifted to include a discussion of the growth in corporations’
data collection practices and their “analytic power” (paragraphs 15 and 16). The later report
mentions  “a  growing  global  consensus  on  minimum  standards  that  should  govern  the
processing of personal data by state, business enterprises and other private actors” (paragraph
28), and insists that the resulting human rights protection “should also apply to information
derived,  inferred,  and  predicted  by  automated  means,  to  the  extent  that  the  information
qualifies as personal data” (paragraph 30). In effect, the 2018 UN report encourages states to
adopt something like the GDPR. Yet there are still important gaps in its recommendations: at no
point  does  the  report  challenge  corporate  data  collection  as  such,  or  recognise  how  the
continuous collection of data from and about persons might in itself undermine values such as
freedom and autonomy,  even though the report  references  the fundamental  European law
principle that the “individual should have an area of autonomous development, interaction and
liberty” (para 5), a point to which we shall return.
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These legal principles, if pursued, might have the potential to disrupt datafication. But so far it is
not legislation but the work of critical legal scholars which has articulated these principles more
fully. Scholars of privacy law have often noted that traditional notions of privacy are inadequate
to deal  with the vast  amount of  data which flows without  being specifically  attached to  a
particular  named  person,  yet,  which  in  combination  with  even  small  amounts  of  other
information related to that person can lead to their identification. The result is, as Solon Barocas
and Helen Nissenbaum put it in the language of American football, “Big Data’s end run around
anonymity and consent” (Barocas and Nissenbaum, 2014). In other words, the scale of data
processing that  generates  decisions affecting the algorithmically  produced entities  or  “data
doubles” (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000) to which actual individuals are tethered makes old style
privacy regulation by individual consent almost impossible to practice. And yet “consent” is the
basic principle on which the GDPR relies.
In response to this problem, Julie Cohen (2013, p. 1931-1932) has proposed an important meta-
principle for regulating data practices, that of “semantic discontinuity”. This is designed to limit
the possibility of separate data sets being combined so as to generate inferences of a sort that
data subjects did not consent to being made. Recently Frischmann and Selinger (2018, p. 275-
276) have endorsed this proposal, which radicalises the older principle of “contextual integrity”
(Nissenbaum, 2010). But we do not know yet if this proposal has any chance of being translated
into law in some form. It runs directly contrary to the purpose of corporate data collection,
which is precisely to combine data streams without limit, so as to maximise the algorithmic
inferences that can be generated from them. How can semantic discontinuity be made effective
as a legal principle when it contradicts the stated purposes of countless corporations who seek
access  to  personal  data? Would the injunction of  the 2018 UN report  that  “personal  data
processing  should  be  necessary  and proportionate  to  a  legitimate  purpose  that  should  be
specified  by  the  processing  entity”  be  sufficient  to  ground  the  principle  of  semantic
discontinuity? Presumably not,  if  a  business  had a  legitimate purpose which depended on
semantic continuity, and that purpose was in broad terms disclosed to, and consented on by, a
data subject. The same question could be asked of non-commercial organisations which might
be protected prima facie by the “public interest exception” written into the GDPR (Article 21
(6)).  On  what  ground  could  a  “higher”  principle  of  semantic  discontinuity  override  that
exception?
What becomes clear  here is  that  a  far-reaching challenge to the expanding rationalities  of
continuous data collection and value extraction runs against the basic organisation of power in
contemporary economies and societies, issues which have not yet been broached by even the
most  enlightened  legislation.  This  potential  conflict  between  critical  legal  thinking  and
capitalism’s investment in datafication was anticipated in a remarkable article two decades ago
by Paul Schwartz (1999). Schwartz foresaw that the emerging data collection practices made
possible by the internet’s new infrastructure of connection would generate “a new structure of
power over individuals” with “significant implications for democracy” (1999, p. 815). Schwartz
also predicted that individualist liberal notions of autonomy would prove inadequate to counter
this development, because they ignore the “constitutive value” (1999, p. 816) that protecting
individuals from regular privacy violations and their consequences have for democratic culture
itself.  Schwartz’s  implicitly  relational  (and  post-liberal:  Cohen,  2013)  understanding  of
autonomy/freedom connects with more recent accounts of the social costs of datafication and
algorithmic decision-making (Eubanks, 2017; Noble, 2018). But the way forward for building
effective  opposition to  the changes under way requires  us  to  move beyond the domain of
contemporary legal theory and introduce a decolonial perspective on what is going on with
datafication. We turn to this in the next section.
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SCHMITT AND COLONIALISM’S RELATION TO LAW
At this juncture our argument finds support in a surprising source, someone who was certainly
not an opponent of historic colonialism: the controversial German legal and political theorist
Carl Schmitt. Schmitt (2006 [o.p. 1950]) offered the most clear-sighted account of the relation
between  law  and  the  appropriation  of  territory  and  natural  resources  within  historic
colonialism,  an  account  which  has  implications,  we  suggest,  for  grasping  the  regulatory
implications of today’s data colonialism. 6 In discussing Schmitt as an exemplary case, we will
admittedly be abstracting from the centuries-long debates about the possible legal justifications
for the domination by some humans of others. Choosing Schmitt however is justified because of
the clarity with which he makes explicit the underlying links between law, force and rationality
within historic colonialism.
Schmitt analysed law’s relation to historic colonialism, and therefore to the industrial capitalism
which colonialism made possible (Schmitt, 2006, p. 4), at a nostalgic moment. Looking back at
colonialism, he found it to be an essential underpinning of a eurocentric international legal
order which he believed had been shattered by Germany’s defeat in World War II. This context
does  not,  however,  diminish  the  importance  of  Schmitt’s  remarkably  direct  portrayal  of
colonialism and its relation to law.
For Schmitt, controversially, the very idea of law (nomos) is based on the seizure of land (2006,
p. 42). He interprets the international law of property and nations that dominated the world
from the  17th  to  mid-20th  centuries  as  emerging  from the  demise  of  an  earlier  order,  the
“medieval spatial order of the respublica Christiana” whose legitimacy was fading by the 16th
century. According to Schmitt, what enabled a new international legal order to be built was the
discovery of “previously unknown (i.e., by Christian sovereigns) oceans, islands, and territories”
(2006, p. 131).
Two things are remarkable about the analysis Schmitt develops. First, he makes no pretence that
colonial conquests were legal in a conventional sense; rather he distinguishes two types of land-
appropriation, those which proceed in accordance with international law, and those (of which
historic colonialism was an example) “which uproot an existing spatial order and establish a new
nomos” of property entitlement (2006, p. 82). In this initially law-less, but ultimately lawful
move of historic colonialism, “law and order are one . . . they cannot be separated” (2006, p. 81).
Order, that is, makes law. Second, Schmitt regards the extra-legal seizure of territory by colonial
powers as  justified by a  higher principle  of  rationality,  or  rather a  legitimate hierarchy in
relation to rationality itself. As he writes (2006, p. 131), “the means of the legal title ‘discovery’
lay in an appeal to the historically higher point of the discoverer vis-à-vis the discovered.” For
Schmitt, the conqueror’s “scientific cartographic survey was a true title to a terra incognita,”
because it embodied a superior rationality, generating a “completely different type of legal title .
. . ‘effective occupation’” (2006, p. 133).
For Schmitt, the history of colonial appropriation represented the legitimate fusion of effective
force (order) into law, justified by a claim to higher knowledge or rationality. Here is Schmitt’s
fullest  statement  of  the  relations  between  law,  force  and  a  certain  “modern”  reading  of
rationality: “European discovery of a new world in the 15th and 16th centuries thus did not occur
by chance . . . it was an achievement of newly awakened Occidental rationalism . . . The Indians
lacked the scientific power of Christian-European rationality. The intellectual advantage was
entirely on the European side, so much so that the New World could simply be ‘taken’” (2006:
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132). This unapologetic argument for colonialism’s rationality offers some interesting parallels
with the contemporary justification and rationalisation of Big Data practices, parallels that we
can only notice within the bifocal approach to capitalism and colonialism that we are proposing.
Within this perspective, we also see more clearly the significance of the failure so far of even the
boldest legislation on datafication to challenge its basic practice: the banal, almost universal
collection of personal and non-personal data, and, through this, the creation from the flow of
human existence of  an informational  terrain from which extraction for  economic value is
possible,  indeed  increasingly  seamless.  What  are  the  parallels  between  the  legal  status  of
contemporary datafication (understood as a  new type of  colonial  enterprise)  and Schmitt’s
reading of the legal status of historic colonialism?
First,  datafication involves  a  de  facto  appropriation of  resources,  a  domain of  connectible
information that, through processing, can be attached reliably to entities that are proxies for
actual individuals (“data doubles”) and thus provide a basis for judgements that effectively
discriminate between real individuals. That appropriation depends on the prior collection of
data,  that  is,  on the multi-dimensional  monitoring of  as  much of  these individuals’  online
activity as possible, regardless of the device they are using. Granted, there is a legal debate and
potential conflict at present (for example via the GDPR) around the legality of some of the
consequences  of  this  appropriation,  just  as  there  was  early  on  in  relation  to  the  Spanish
conquests of the “New” World. But, as we saw, these legal debates tend never to challenge the
fundamental fact of continuous monitoring itself, even if it is in tension with established values
such as autonomy (for example the “right to full development of the personality” under German
constitutional law: Hornung and Schnabel, 2009).
Second, although it is as yet only in the early stages of development, a justificatory ideology of
data appropriation is emerging that parallels Schmitt’s version of colonial ideology: the vision
that only through the superior calculating power of Big Data and machine learning can a higher
state of human knowledge be achieved, thereby justifying corporate access to data that can be
extracted from the flow of individuals’ daily lives. The core issue here is the imposing on the
whole domain of human life a very specific version of rationality which requires all life to be
tracked continuously in the interests,  simultaneously,  of capital and of a certain version of
human knowledge (the vision of Big Data or dataism).
It  follows,  thirdly,  —and  here  we  move  from parallels  onto  implications— that  the  more
fundamental challenge to processes of datafication to which critical legal scholars such as Cohen
and Frischmann are committed requires a challenge to the underlying legitimacy of acquiring
data through data relations, which is today a feature of most platforms, apps, and mechanisms
for knowledge production and daily organisation (think of the Internet of Things).  Cohen’s
principle  of  “semantic  discontinuity”  is  important,  but  only  goes  so  far  as  challenging the
transferability  of  data,  when  it  is  the  very  act  of  collecting  data  that  must  above  all  be
challenged.
There are indeed good reasons (which Cohen in her work has noted) for arguing that the
continuous  collection  of  data  from  and  about  individuals  conflicts  with  the  principle  of
autonomy on which democracies, fundamentally, rely. Continuous surveillance or monitoring by
the state is, after all, generally regarded as “chilling” of individual agency (Cohen, 2013, p. 1911-
1912). The same is true of surveillance when it is conducted by private corporations, particularly
if those corporations often have both capacity and need to yield up data to the state. What so far
has been difficult to assert is the primacy of these concerns against the opposing rationality of
the social quantification sector, which relies on its “effective occupation” of human life (to use
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Schmitt’s chilling phrase) as the starting-point for defending its practices of data collection
against interference by the state. What is needed is to reject precisely this act of “effective
occupation”. What cuts through all the rationalities which mask the dynamics of datafication is
precisely the realisation that the social quantification sector’s “right” to hold what they gather is
no more legally justifiable than (and just as legally contentious as) the effective occupation of
overseas territory by colonial states once was.
If so, the existence (or not) of “consent” to continuous monitoring is beside the point. What
matters are the implications of this occupation for what we call the space of the self, that is, the
basic idea of selfhood on which most notions of democracy and even legal authority rely. 7 We
are drawing here on a relational notion of freedom which assumes that “individual” freedom can
only emerge through a web of social relations (Elias, 1978), but also more specifically on the idea
that,  underlying all  notions of  freedom and autonomy (some of  which no doubt are today
unsatisfactory) and underlying also all culturally relative formulations of personal privacy, is a
basic notion of the “space of the self”: that is, “the socially grounded integrity without which we
cannot recognize ourselves or others as selves at all” (Couldry and Mejias, 2019, p. 155). This is
the space that Hegel captured in his relational definition of freedom as “the freedom to be with
oneself in the other” and that Dussel terms the “natural substantivity of the person.” 8
Our approach to reframing legal challenges to datafication is, we acknowledge, expansive. It cuts
across the detailed debates of policy and law in particular contexts. But it usefully sidesteps the
confusion caused by the anomalous notion of “personal data”. As many critics of traditional
notions of privacy have noted, much of the data that makes a difference to how we are treated by
corporations is not personal data, because it is not exactly “about” us. Rather, it is relational
data,  in  which  patterns  emerge  across  myriad  comparisons  within  much larger  data  sets,
patterns that predict particular outcomes for a data double to which as a real individual each of
us is tethered. The protection of “personal data” in a more straightforward sense—data about
individuals and data files such as photos that an individual claims to own—is therefore likely
only to protect people from part of the harms that can be done to them through data. Our
approach challenges the very validity of continuous data collection, regardless of what entities
happen to be affected by any one particular decision or practice. It challenges, in other words,
the multiple practices which construct the new “territory” of human life from which something
like “personal data” emerges as potentially extractable, a territory which is steadily supplanting
the  space  of  social  interaction  and  social  governance  that  was  taken  for  granted  before
datafication through a process that started centuries before the advent of digital data. In other
words, it makes this challenge in response to processes of human subjection that only a colonial
perspective can fully recognise.
There is one last and crucial respect in which legal and civic challenges to datafication require
the frame of colonialism. This regards the underlying rationality of Big Data itself which works
as  a  reference-point  for  and  legitimation  of  data  collection  in  all  its  breadth  and  depth.
Underlying all the specific and important issues under discussion about algorithmic injustice
lies a deeper injustice that, following decolonial thinker Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014), we
can call “cognitive injustice”. Put simply, this is the assumption that there is only one path to
human knowledge and that it lies through the progressive extraction, collection, processing and
evaluation  of  data  from  the  flow  of  human  life,  and  indeed  life  more  generally.  9  The
characteristics of this rationality have been expressed not by an analyst of capitalism or even
modernity, but a decolonial thinker, the Peruvian sociologist Aníbal
Quijano, reflecting on the relations between capitalism, modernity and the longer process of not
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just historic colonialism but coloniality:
Outside the ‘West’,  virtually  in all  known cultures… all  systematic  production of
knowledge is  associated with a perspective of  totality.  But in those cultures,  the
perspective  of  totality  in  knowledge  includes  the  acknowledgement  of  the
heterogeneity of all reality; of the irreducible, contradictory character of the latter; of
the legitimacy, i.e., the desirability of the diverse character of the components of all
reality — and therefore, of the social. The [better, alternative] idea of social totality,
then,  not  only  does  not  deny,  but  depends  on  the  historical  diversity  and
heterogeneity of society, of every society. In other words, it not only does not deny,
but it requires  the idea of an ‘other’ — diverse, different. (Quijano, 2007, p. 177,
added emphasis).
Through the quantification of the social, we risk installing a new version of this exclusive notion
of rationality, via what Jose van Dijck (2014) has called “dataism”. Only legal proposals which
challenge rationales of data collection in this more fundamental way can hope, effectively, to
challenge the direction of data colonialism.
Our approach therefore stands firmly against other recent proposals for individuals to own
“their” data, be free to manage access to it, and perhaps even to be paid in return for such access
(Lanier, 2013; Arrieta-Ibarra et al, 2018; for a recent popular argument in The Economist, see
will.i.am (2019)). Such proposals risk legitimating precisely the underlying practices of data
collection,  and  ignoring  completely  the  rationality  of  appropriation  which  underlies  data
colonialism.
CONCLUSION
Our goal in this article has been to develop the starting-points of a more radical and potentially
more  comprehensive  approach  to  framing  critical  legal  and  policy  responses  to  ongoing
processes of datafication. We began by reframing what is currently going on with data not just
within the continuing expansion of capitalism, but as a new and epochal renewal of colonialism
itself, which, in time, may pave the way for a stage of capitalism whose full outline we cannot yet
predict.
By placing datafication within the longer history of colonial appropriations of territory and
natural resources on a global scale, we seek to address more effectively the fundamental unease
across  wide  sectors  of  the  population  at  today’s  practices  of  expanding  surveillance  via
marketing, artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things. Existing legal approaches, and even
critical legal theory, fall short of providing an adequate starting-point for wider critique. So too
do accounts of capitalism which frame what is going on with data principally in terms of recent
developments (surveillance capitalism, platform capitalism, and the like), rather than the longer
term relations between colonialism and capitalism.
By contrast, legal approaches which take seriously Carl Schmitt’s reading of the role of historic
colonialism in making law through effective force (that is,  what becomes an order) offer a
warning of the underlying direction of change. Unless we grasp this, policy debate regarding the
challenges of datafication is always likely to fall short of the mark.
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A postscript: One day after being fined for privacy violations, Google announced that “data is
more like sunlight than oil” (Ghosh and Kanter, 2019). In other words, instead of a resource that
is being appropriated from someone’s territory, Google would like us to believe that data is a
replenishable,  inexhaustible,  owner-less  resource  that  can be  harvested sustainably  for  the
benefit  of  humanity.  This  illusion,  once  again,  conveniently  bypasses  the  questions  about
privacy and protecting the individual that any attempt at “regulation” would normally want to
raise. Instead, this “regulation” attempts to establish data colonialism as the status quo. It is
time for a more radical grounding of established regulatory discourse that enables it to challenge
datafication’s  social  order.  This  must  involve  more  than regulatory  adjustments  to  certain
aspects  of  contemporary  capitalism.  What  is  required  is  a  fundamental  challenge  to  the
direction and rationale of capitalism as a whole in the emerging era of data colonialism.
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FOOTNOTES
1. The full context of our argument is provided in Couldry and Mejias (2019). We have
developed it since 2016, and first presented it publicly at the Big Data in the Global South
network at IAMCR, Cartagena, Colombia, in July 2017 (https://data-
activism.net/2017/07/datactive-presents-big-data-from-the-south-in-cartagena-july-15/). For a
summary version of our book’s argument, see Couldry and Mejias (2018).
2. We therefore question the boundary between “capitalism” and “surveillance capitalism”
(sometimes called “raw surveillance capitalism”) on which Zuboff relies, when she writes:
“When a firm collects behavioral data with permission solely as a means to product or service
improvement, it is committing capitalism but not surveillance capitalism” (2019, p. 22). But this
assumes a world where “permission” is clearly delineated, and the purposes of data use and
scope of data collection are neatly delineated too: the purpose of data colonialism is to blur
those boundaries in the service of a broader appropriation of human life itself.
3. Interestingly Zuboff notes the colonial precedent at certain points (e.g., Chapter 6), but
without either theorising data processes as a new type of colonialism, or explaining the
implications of the colonial precedent for her framing of what’s going on with data exclusively in
terms of capitalism.
4. For recent valuable discussions of the colonial in relation to data, Thatcher et al. (2017) see
‘data colonialism’ explicitly as a metaphor, while Cohen (2017) and Shepherd (2015) emphasise
neo-colonial continuities in data practices. None proposes, as we do, that data practices
constitute literally a new phase of colonialism.
5. This unorthodox extension of Marx’s critical theory of capitalism is inspired by Moishe
Postone’s reading of Marx and the importance of abstraction, rather than labour as such, as the
fundamental driver of creating a capitalist social order (Postone, 1998). There is no space to
discuss this in detail here, but see Couldry and Mejias, 2018; Couldry and Mejias, 2019, chapter
1.
6. For an earlier discussion of Schmitt’s discussion of law and colonialism in relation to the
internet, see Bratton (2016: 19-40).
7. Our larger argument here draws on the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel and Enrique Dussel: for
more detail, see Couldry and Mejias (2019, chapter 5). On the question of legal authority, see
Hildebrandt (2015).
8. See Hegel’s Encyclopedia quoted by Pippin (2008, p. 186); Dussel (1985, p.158).
9. On data extraction from physical nature, see Gabryz (2016).
